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Community resilience in rural China:  





Building on conceptual frameworks to assess community resilience developed by Emery and 
Flora (2006) and Kelly et al. (2015), this study analyses the resilience of Hu village (Sichuan, 
China). The resilience of the village is assessed in the face of multiple and complex slow- and 
fast onset anthropogenic disturbances, especially the impacts of globalisation and 
modernisation, which have substantially transformed Chinese society. Hu village is typical for 
a rural community in transition affected by industrialisation, deagrarianisation, counter-
urbanisation and changing stakeholder expectations and opportunities. This has been 
accompanied by agricultural depopulation, outmigration, increasing non-farm employment, 
declining agricultural incomes, and associated social and psychological changes – processes 
that have decreased community resilience. Overall, Hu village emerges as only moderately 
resilient with tendencies for a further weakening of resilience. While economic, social and 
cultural domains are (still) moderately resilient, the natural and political domains show weak 
resilience. Building on critical studies of Chinese rural areas (e.g. Ye and He, 2008; He, 2010; 
Huang et al., 2010) the study concludes by arguing that Chinese government policies need to 






The notion of community resilience is gaining increasing importance in contemporary society, 
especially as many communities around the world appear to be gradually losing resilience in 
the face of challenges such as climate change, outmigration of young people and socio-
economic ruptures (Rigg, 2006, 2007; Wilson, 2012a; Kelly et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2018). 
Resilience is generally understood as the ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
slow- or fast-onset shocks/disturbances to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from 
shocks/disturbances including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions (Wilson, 2012a). Often it is not the magnitude of a single event which 
determines whether a ‘disaster’ is considered to have occurred but a combination of 
circumstances, including conflict, poverty and environmental degradation, the protracted 
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legacies of past events, or a cascade of events caused by interdependencies in a system, which 
have affected the capacity of a community to respond (Brown, 2014; Wilson et al., 2018).  
      Hitherto the focus of resilience research has been largely on communities in developed 
countries, with more limited emphasis on developing or transition economies (Rigg et al., 
2012). There is a particular gap in research in countries such as China that are currently 
undergoing rapid urban and rural change and where rural communities are facing 
unprecedented transformations (Wang, 2016; Tian, 2016). Like many other transition 
economies, in China research on themes associated with resilience has gradually increased in 
importance over the last few years (e.g. even studies investigating issues such as the resilience 
of the Chinese Communist Party, see Hillman, 2014, Meng, 2016). In China large-scale fast-
onset shocks such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake have generated greater interest in 
understanding community resilience (e.g. Wang et al., 2009, 2010; Fu et al., 2014; Li et al., 
2016). To better rebuild local communities devastated by the earthquake the government 
launched the ‘Post-disaster Reconstruction Regulation for the Sichuan Earthquake’ in 2008 
which stressed that reconstruction of communities should take a comprehensive approach with 
an emphasis on economic and social reconstruction and environmental protection. Yet, Chinese 
studies about post-disaster reconstruction generally do not refer to the term ‘community 
resilience’, although there are studies that have investigated complex processes of the 
reconstruction and recovery at local level that include proxy resilience indicators such as 
economic growth, infrastructure rebuilding, social governance reforms, as well as cultural and 
environmental restoration (e.g. Li, 2017). Chen (2014), for example, found that affected 
communities were not only damaged by the earthquake but also by the subsequent state-
dominated top-down reconstruction process which further damaged endogenous social 
relations. Although Chen did not specifically refer to notions of ‘resilience’, his findings 
suggest that community resilience was considerably weakened by both the disaster and the 
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state-led reconstruction process. Some studies have also pointed to the importance of the 
restoration of social memories associated with community reconstruction after the earthquake 
(e.g. Wen and He, 2016). Researchers have particularly highlighted the importance of 
rebuilding post-disaster social relations, and that reconstruction should not only focus on 
restoration but should also improve resilience to deal with potential future disasters (e.g. Li et 
al., 2009; Jiang, 2017). Li (2017) reviewed Chinese disaster studies for 2008-2017 and found 
that there was an upsurge in research after 2008, with key themes including resilience proxies 
such as post-disaster reconstruction, social, economic and cultural transitions and adaptions, 
coping approaches, or making better use of local knowledge.    
      Yet, this increasing interest in resilience-related themes to natural hazards has hitherto not 
generated studies investigating slow-onset and less traumatic disturbances affecting Chinese 
rural communities that are facing unprecedented socio-economic and cultural change. This 
highlights that there is still a paucity of the use of the term ‘resilience’ in Chinese policy 
discourse and that resilience is primarily conceived of in terms of resilience to natural disasters 
rather than having wider social and economic meaning. Key reasons for the paucity of 
resilience research on Chinese communities (both rural and urban) are both the continuing 
political opaqueness of the country making investigation of subtle and complex socio-political 
transitions difficult, and the still formidable language/cultural barriers for many Western 
researchers affecting in-depth qualitative work. 
      Using a case study of a rural village in Sichuan province (China), this study analyses the 
resilience of this community in the face of multiple and complex slow- and fast onset 
disturbances. Resilience will be assessed against a backdrop of natural and anthropogenic 
disturbances as conceptualised by Wilson (2012a). Although China faces regular natural 
catastrophes challenging the resilience of rural communities (Fu et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016), 
the key focus will be on anthropogenic disturbances, especially the impacts of globalisation 
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and modernisation. As Rigg (2006) highlighted, rural communities in transition economies 
such as China have increasingly changed from production to consumption-oriented locations, 
driven by processes such as industrialisation, deagrarianisation, counter-urbanisation and 
changing stakeholder expectations and opportunities. This has often been accompanied by 
agricultural depopulation, outmigration, increasing non-farm employment, declining 
agricultural incomes, and associated social and psychological changes (Rigg, 2001) – processes 
that often decrease community resilience (Wilson, 2012b; Wilson et al., 2016). Building on 
Rigg (2007), the focus will specifically be on community-level processes and structures, 
networks and stakeholder interactions. Specific emphasis will be placed on investigating the 
characteristics of the case study community, the role that economic, social and cultural factors 
play in shaping community resilience (e.g. attitudes towards agriculture as an economic activity, 
community values and cohesion, structure of family relations, intra-household labour divisions, 
family labour division, pluriactivity), as well as discussing the importance of the changing 
policy framework at national and local levels and demographic changes (e.g. geriatrification, 
gender, family structures and types) for understanding community resilience.  
 
 
Understanding rural community resilience in China: concepts and issues 
 
Building on critical resilience studies (e.g. Miller et al., 2010; Wilson, 2010, 2012a, 2015), this 
study will use the notion of resilience as a normative concept based on the assumption that 
resilience can be situated along a spectrum of ‘good’ resilience and ‘bad’ vulnerability, where 
resilience-vulnerability are seen as oppositional terms situated on the same spectrum and where 
resilience is a desirable or better outcome. Only a normative resilience concept that sees 
resilience as a positive goal to be achieved will allow directional policy-making that aims at 
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reducing vulnerability, whereby the ultimate yardstick for assessing resilience is the survival 
of a community as a cohesive unit able to withstand future shocks and disturbances. This study 
will, therefore, refer to notions of ‘strong’, ‘moderate’ and ‘weak’ resilience, whereby weak 
resilience is seen as synonymous with strong vulnerability. 
      To assess resilience at community level, this study will use the conceptual framework 
developed by Emery and Flora (2006) and Kelly et al. (2015) which suggests that social, 
cultural, natural, economic and political/institutional/governance-related factors need to be 
taken into account to understand how ‘resilient’ a community is (Figure 1). Although obtaining 
a full set of information on all these factors can be challenging, one key advantage of this 
framework is that it can be applied to any community. Many authors have emphasised the 
importance of understanding the complex interplay between various ‘domains’ for 
understanding community resilience (e.g. Emery and Flora, 2006; Buikstra et al., 2010; Wilson, 
2012a), suggesting that community resilience will be strongest where the different domains 
intersect, provided these domains are well developed. As Figure 1 suggests, There are close 
interlinkages between the five domains and they broadly have equal ‘weighting’, and therefore 
weakening one domain (through outmigration for example) can also affect other domains (by 
reducing social capital, for example). Processes affecting community resilience are, thus, non-
linear, interlink in complex ways, and are often cumulative (Wilson, 2012a). Kelly et al.’s 
(2015) model also implies that communities can never be fully resilient as they always contain 
certain elements/processes that are contributing to vulnerability. Building on Resilience 
Alliance (2007), Wilson (2012a) and Kelly et al. (2015), certain assumptions will be made 
about which factors and processes raise or lower community resilience, some of which are 
relatively well established in the literature and relatively ‘neutral’, while others are more 




Insert Figure 1 in or near here 
 
Insert Table 1 in or near here 
 
      Many studies highlight how economic factors influence community resilience (Buikstra et 
al., 2010; Brown, 2014), although much debate exists about the possible relationship between 
embeddedness of communities into capitalist and globalised economic networks or, in the case 
of transition economies such as China, about how the integration of rural areas into a more 
market-driven economy has affected community resilience (Table 1). In particular, the question 
whether globalisation may facilitate more resilient pathways by providing more wide-ranging 
opportunities for development is still hotly debated (Wilson, 2012b). Economic drivers that are 
often seen to exacerbate the vulnerability of communities include poverty (i.e. lack of resources 
to implement endogenous resilient pathways; Rigg, 2001), over-dependency on external forms 
of income (e.g. remittances or subsidies; Huang et al., 2010) or high income inequalities which 
can weaken community cohesion, trust and networks (Rigg, 2006; Kelly et al., 2015).  
      In China, the most dramatic economic changes in the past decades have occurred in urban 
areas linked to a state-led gradualist transition from a planned economy to a market economy 
which has led to a rapid rise of urban areas acting as magnets for the rural poor. This great ‘lift-
off’ started in 1978 when the Communist Party began loosening rules that ensured that farmers 
stayed on the land to produce food. From the late 1970s farmers gradually gained more 
freedoms, especially to farm their own plots of land and sell their produce privately 
(decollectivisation). This led to a re-invigoration of China’s traditional smallholder intensive 
farming system characterised by small-scale ‘peasant’ farms (<2 ha) with a few state controlled 
large agribusinesses. Since 2005, government policies have provided farmers with subsidies 
(e.g. for grain production, machinery, micro-credits) to increase agricultural production (Huang 
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et al., 2010). Simultaneously, Chinese agriculture has been progressively integrated into 
international markets and, since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, agricultural prices in 
China have become more closely linked to those of international markets. From the 1990s 
onwards rural-urban migration became the most important pathway for farmers to find off-
farm employment (Xia, 2016), with an estimated 200-300 million rural Chinese (mostly men) 
having permanently or temporarily migrated to urban areas – a transition that is far from 
complete in the late 2010s and with ongoing repercussions for rural community resilience.  
      The social domain is similarly crucial for resilience because it mediates the relationship 
between economic, cultural and environmental components of a community (see Figure 1). 
Rural residents are social actors who exert agency according to specifically situated social 
relations and cultural norms. Key social factors include community member interactions such 
as relationships, trust, engagement of young and old people, conflict resolution processes, 
strength of networks, learning and communication pathways, bonding and bridging capitals, 
cooperation, as well as community ‘cohesiveness’ (Rigg et al., 2012). These factors affect 
community resilience, as well developed social processes are usually a sign of strong adaptive 
capacity to deal with shocks/disturbances. Communities with weak social capital allow 
practices that enhance vulnerability, collective concerns are more likely to be overridden by 
powerful stakeholders, and community interests may become fragmented (Wilson et al., 2016). 
Outmigration of young people is often a key cause of a weak social domain, and is a process 
closely linked to economic factors. Outmigration is a particularly important factor to consider 
in  any community setting as it is both a driver for vulnerability (e.g. loss of social memory 
and skills) as well as a response to declining resilience (i.e. young people leave villages due to 
lack of opportunities; see Table 1).  
      Outmigration particularly leads to ageing/geriatrified communities which affects social 
dynamics, disrupts inter-generational communication, and interrupts social memory through 
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loss of experience and knowledge. Once social memory is lost, it can no longer be used to 
address shocks/disturbances (Wilson, 2015). As Table 1 highlights, these social processes have 
been largely negative for resilience, although remittances can have positive effects (De Brauw 
and Rozelle, 2003). As a result of migration, local institutions may fail to adapt which can lead 
to lowering bonding capital through break-down of personal exchange, weakening of 
community cohesion, and the breakdown of communities of common ideologies and sets of 
rules. Chinese rural-urban migration is, nonetheless, tempered by the ‘hukou’ (household 
registration) system – an instrument of social stability in China’s planned economy – which 
means personal status is classified by either agricultural/non-agricultural residential location 
and socio-economic eligibility to services. The hukou system, therefore, acts like an internal 
passport as rural migrants cannot become legal residents in cities and have to regularly 
commute between cities and their original villages1 . Linked to this quest for modernity, 
agriculture in China has been widely downplayed not only by non-rural stakeholders but also 
by rural residents themselves. Through the rhetoric of urban/rural difference rural space and 
rural residents have been culturally construed as ‘backward’ and ‘traditional’ (Lei, 2003), 
inferior to urban residents who are associated with notions of ‘modern’, ‘progressive’ and 
‘promising’ (see also Rigg et al., 2012, for similar patterns in other Asian countries). Rural-
urban migration has, thus, particularly changed values associated with farming, with 
agriculture increasingly stigmatised by new social and cultural norms as a low status 
occupation, pushing young rural people out of agriculture (Xia, 2016). 
      The cultural domain, meanwhile, encompasses rites, ideologies, societal norms, traditions 
and conventions. Cultural factors are important as they include complex processes of human 
activities passed down not by genetic inheritance or environmental pressure but by teaching, 
                                                
1 In December 2015 the hukou system was modified following years of half-hearted tinkering. Migrant workers 
who have lived in a city for at least 6 months can now apply for special residency permits which provide some of 
the benefits of an urban hukou (e.g. access to health care; children <15 can attend local state school). 
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imitation and conformism (Wilson, 2012a). Teaching and learning are, therefore, key to 
understanding the importance of cultural processes on community resilience, as is the moral 
component with community rules, traditions and rites that buttress ‘way things are done’ and 
which punishes infractions (see Table 1). Ultimately, cultural processes allow individuals to do 
things as part of a group that they would not be able to achieve by themselves. Ideologies are 
closely linked to how societal fashions and preferences change, and how such changes affect 
decision-making processes within communities (Rigg et al., 2012). These, in turn, affect the 
quality of social, economic, and natural domains at community level. Cultural factors can, 
therefore, be seen as the lattice of ideas that permeate communities and that constitute 
collective social consciousness.  
      Of key importance for community resilience are also the closely inter-linked factors of 
politics/policies, governance and institutional structures, i.e. forces from ‘outside’ linked to 
political and institutional developments that are difficult to influence by communities 
(Cumming et al., 2005). Key for resilience is the existence/absence of political will and the 
possibility to implement policies that help communities tackle shocks/disturbances, while 
entrenched local politics can lead to corruption, apathy, and a lack of integration of knowledge. 
The political domain is, therefore, often portrayed as ‘conservative’ or ‘negative’ for 
innovation, as it has a tendency to channel decisions into established pathways, rather than 
encouraging innovative thinking. These changes illustrate the dramatic impact of the Chinese 
state on everyday village life and agricultural productivity (Tian, 2016). 
      The final domain affecting community resilience is related to natural factors such as water 
quality and availability, the type and quality of soils, or the steepness and accessibility of the 
terrain (Kelly et al., 2015). Emphasis in this study will be placed on environmental 
repercussions of agricultural practices at community level and the general assessment of the 
health and well-being of the environment upon which residents of the case study community 
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Our assessment of the resilience of a rural community in China is based on one case study 
community in SW China, whereby ‘rural community’ is understood as a group of socially 
interacting people living in a rural settlement and sharing one or more common ties. Rigg (2007) 
argued that studying a rural village community allows for an ‘everyday geography’ that 
connects ordinary people’s everyday lives with macro-forces such as modernisation and 
globalisation. Focusing in-depth on just one community, thus, allows obtaining holistic and 
meaningful information about real-life events, life cycles of individuals and households, 
organisational and managerial processes at village level, information about neighbourhood 
change and, most importantly, about the complex socio-cultural interactions of community 
members associated with resilience processes highlighted in Table 1. For over 50 years, 
Chinese social scientists have analysed China’s transformation through village case studies (e.g. 
He, 2010; Huang et al., 2010), suggesting that Chinese villages are still relatively independent 
economic, social and cultural entities. However, in the wake of modernisation, marketisation 
and globalisation, villages are no longer closed and autonomous entities and act increasingly 
as a bridge between state and society.  
      The village of Hu in the province of Sichuan (SW China) was selected as a case study. 
Sichuan province is the 4th largest in China in population, 5th largest in grain output, 6th with 
regard to GDP in 2015 (36,800 yuan/capita GDP in 2015, below national GDP average), and 
with a relatively low rate of urbanisation (only 47% in 2015; national urbanization rate 57%). 
Sichuan is in an early stage of industrialisation and urbanisation, and communities provide 
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good opportunities as case studies to analyse their resilience while undergoing rapid transition. 
Hu village is a small rural community with 882 households (2938 residents), situated south-
west of the Chengdu Plain ca 100km from Chengdu city and 10 km from the provincial town 
of Qingshen (Figure 2). The village economy is largely agricultural based with 142 ha of 
cultivated land of which the majority are paddy fields with a per capita farming area of only 
0.05ha (‘smallholder farming’ typical for China). The per capita net income of each Hu village 
household was ca 5700 yuan in 2009 [ca US$ 800].  
 
Insert Figure 2 in or near here 
 
Hu village was selected for three reasons. First, agricultural production is typical for south-
west China, including rice, rape, corn, sweet potato, pig farming and sericulture (silk), while 
cash crops (e.g. rape, orange plantations) are increasingly common. Both subsistence 
cultivation and market production exist, which enables a comprehensive understanding of 
different agricultural trajectories. Second, different forces and processes are acting on 
economic processes in Hu Village which acting as ‘meeting points’ of various macro- and 
micro-level processes. Due to rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, many rural labourers 
have migrated to cities to seek money, while multiple job holding is a key livelihood strategy 
for many Hu villagers. As below analysis will show, this has greatly transformed the 
demography and socio-economic landscape of the community. Hu Village is, thus, a typical 
community with nearly 60% of households affected by migration. Third, Hu Village is tightly 
embedded in the national context of rural reforms initiated by central government, and village 
history reveals that every major state reform has affected the village.  
      A multi-method approach was used with quantitative and qualitative elements to triangulate 
findings that included a questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
participant observation and analysis of secondary sources. Using a face-to-face questionnaire 
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with 225 households (ca 1/4 of all households), quantitative data was obtained on demographic 
characteristics of respondents/household members, land use practices, land transfer processes, 
agricultural production, inputs and outputs, pluriactivity, socio-cultural practices and issues, 
non-farm activities and migration. Cluster sampling was used to avoid geographical or socio-
economic bias, to capture the diversity and heterogeneity, and to ensure coverage of the whole 
village.  
      Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews (main researcher fluent 
in Mandarin) which targeted multiple stakeholders within and beyond the case study 
community. Interviews included information about viewpoints and attitudes about policies, 
farming, land use, migration and rural and socio-cultural change at community level (e.g. 
family relationships, education, community values). Farming respondents were selected 
through the questionnaire survey, while migrants were identified and selected through a 
snowballing strategy. Interviews with village cadres were straightforward as the female village 
head introduced the researcher to other cadres, although officials were reluctant to talk about 
anything but the ‘official’ party line. Overall 33 semi-structured interviews were held (15 
farmers, 10 migrants, 3 village cadres, 2 businessmen, 2 township-level officials, 1 county-
level official). In addition, 8 focus groups (4-8 participants) provided invaluable information 
on resilience characteristics and processes, as well as more in-depth information about 
underlying reasons and logics behind residents’ actions and thoughts (two male and female 
groups, one ‘mixed gender group’, two farmer groups, one for village cadres, one with residents 
without land, and one group with migrants).  
      Participant observation formed another important methodological pillar, with the 
researcher deliberately immersing himself for several months in the community’s everyday 
rhythms and routines and developing relationships with village residents (Spradley, 2016). This 
included writing accounts of how these relationships developed in a daily field diary, what was 
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learned from these observations, observing daily patterns and processes in the community, and 
at times just sitting back and watching activities unfold.  
      The final methodological step included analysis of secondary information such as official 
statistics about the community in the form of yearbooks (agricultural output, migration data, 
etc.), policy documents provided by the village committee, and various newspapers (province 
and county level).  
      Building on critical resilience studies and methodologies (Resilience Alliance, 2007; Kelly 
et al., 2015), quantitative and qualitative information was used to assess the resilience of the 
community based on key parameters/indicators highlighted in Figure 1 and Table 1 (above). 
While several indicators could be judged to be objective in nature (i.e. relative consensus about 
validity and ‘direction’ of indicator for assessing resilience; see Cumming et al., 2005; 
Resilience Alliance, 2007), some indicators were inevitably subjective and may only apply in 
specific socio-cultural contexts (see Table 1). Further, as most critical resilience studies 
highlight, most community resilience research is based on ‘snapshots in time’ with data 
collected in case study communities over relatively short time frames (Wilson et al., 2016) – 
and this study is no exception. But resilience can only be assessed by investigating changes in 
community processes (Wilson, 2012a), and this study, therefore, ensured that contemporary 
resilience processes were conceptualised within a wider context of temporal change, i.e. only 
by understanding some of the key recent trends in Hu village was it possible to reach 
conclusions as to whether resilience has increased or decreased. 
 
 




With regard to the economic domain, many macro-scalar economic transitions find specific 
reflection in Hu village. Several interviewees highlighted, for example, that like many Chinese 
communities the village has been transformed in recent years from an agricultural village 
dominated by smallholder farms and households to a community where the importance of 
farming has been marginalised – a typical example of gradual deagrarianisation (Rigg, 2007). 
As a result, non-agricultural income today makes up over 60% of village income and the most 
important source of income now comes from remittances (ca 50% of non-farm income) sent 
by villagers who have migrated to urban areas. Overall, 60% of all households in Hu village 
have migrants who live permanently in urban areas, mainly in Chengdu (the provincial capital). 
Most Hu village migrants have secondary education and above, and a substantial fraction are 
no longer involved in farming. Indeed, Sichuan province is one of the key areas in China 
heavily affected by rural-urban migration (Fan, 2009), with 22 million rural labourers (ca. 1/4 
of the population) having moved to urban areas (in and beyond Sichuan). As a result of 
migration remittances in Hu village, the average net household income today is about 11,000 
yuan/year (ca £1200), higher than the Sichuan provincial average and higher than the national 
average of ca 9000 yuan/year. The fact that farming households are the poorest and non-
farming households have higher average incomes in Hu village explains why agriculture is 
increasingly marginalised. Indeed, China overall is now one of the least equal societies on the 
globe with a Gini coefficient of 0.462 in 2015, the highest in OECD countries. Thus, in many 
Chinese rural communities low agricultural income acts as a primary driver for residents 
seeking non-farm activities or to migrate (Xia, 2016).  
      For Hu village, the outcome of this inequality is reduction in farm labour and reduced 
farming outputs, although production of rice and rape (the two most important crops) is still 
broadly in line with regional and national averages (Hu and Rahman, 2015). Further, more than 
                                                
2 Gini coefficient = standard measure of income inequality where 0 means total equality and 1 total inequality. 
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one-fifth of Hu village households still continue to have >80% of their income from farming, 
and overall agriculture still makes up ca 40% of all village income, with livestock farming the 
most important source of income (see Huang et al., 2010, for similar patterns in other parts of 
China). Most households, therefore, still produce some agricultural produce (e.g. chicken, 
horticulture), and crop farming is still practiced by households largely for subsistence. This 
highlights both that most households still have not yet completely lost the link to the land, and 
that agriculture continues to play an irreplaceable social security role for most village 
households. However, the sale of product locally does not generate much income, and a key 
constraint for increasing profits is the small parcel sizes of only ca 0.05 ha/resident. 
      Migration has severely affected the type of agriculture practiced in Hu village, confirming 
results from other studies that have observed changes in cropping patterns and land use driven 
by migration (e.g. Rigg, 2001, for south-east Asia). Although Hu village is still characteristic 
of an ‘integrated farming system’ as a mixed crop/livestock smallholder system where family 
labour is important, diversification is now key for survival. While rice still occupies almost 2/3 
of the farmed land (mainly for home consumption; surplus sold to market), rape is gaining 
importance, and citrus fruit and tree plantations (e.g. mulberry) are becoming more prominent. 
Nonetheless, cropping has declined over the past 20 years, especially as the increasing wealth 
of Hu villagers means that more food can be bought, and traditional small-scale livestock and 
poultry farming (pigs most important, followed by the rearing of chicken, duck and rabbit) is 
also in decline. In addition, the decline in traditional sericulture was particularly lamented by 
many respondents. Sericulture traditionally was the most important side-line for most Hu 
households, but has lost importance due to low payoff and high technological and labour 
requirements. As a result, most sericulturalists are elderly or household wives who cannot 
migrate. To deal with increasing lack of labour linked to outmigration (see also below), Hu 
residents have also begun planting trees (e.g. Osmanthus fragrans) which are less labour 
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intensive, echoing Rigg’s (2007) study that highlighted tree growing as a popular alternative 
to deal with lack of labour in Southeast Asia. Trees as cash crops are, therefore, primarily 
driven by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in China.  
      Diversification in Hu village is particularly evident in two seemingly contradictory trends: 
subsistence-oriented crops still outweigh cash crops in terms of area cultivated, suggesting that 
the village can still be classified as a largely subsistence-oriented community, but 
simultaneously large livestock enterprises have emerged with >100 pigs (ca 20 households 
specialising in pig farming), three households  have become specialised chicken producers, and 
two have established commercial duck enterprises with >20,000 animals (see also Rae et al., 
2006). This suggests that the traditional smallholder crop and livestock mixed farming system 
will be progressively replaced by a more specialised, modernised, larger-scale and more 
market-oriented farming sector. Nonetheless, labour shortages are leading to more extensive 
use of land overall and crop diversity may be reduced (see also Rigg, 2007, for south-east Asia), 
but strategies vary depending on household labour and other economic conditions. Farming 
households with migrants, for example, have significantly reduced land-use intensity due to 
lack of labour.  
      These trends of both diversification and specialisation can be exemplified by two 
households. First, Respondent Z’s household is typical of a highly diversified business that 
includes a small shop, 50 pigs (mainly tended by mother), a commercial fodder business (run 
by father), and the recent planting of ca 1000m2 of former rice fields with Osmanthus trees. 
Second, the dangers of focusing on one key commodity where highlighted by Mr S, operator 
of the largest pig farm in Hu village (400 pigs), who argued that “pig production is a highly 
risky sector with very unstable pig prices, and rising grain prices keep raising feed costs and 
squeezing profit, so other family members work on other activities to reduce the risk and also 
sometimes subsidise pig production with cash when necessary”. This suggests that with 
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increasing levels of emigration from Hu village intensive pig farming is a likely to remain a 
risky strategy. 
      It is evident that the migration cycle greatly influences agricultural pathways in Hu village, 
and three typical patterns can be identified which affect nearly every farm household.  First, 
family migrants may return home at certain times of the year to help on farms, but this happens 
in only ca 20% of Hu farming households suggesting that remaining farm families can no 
longer rely on help from their migrant children. While on average six different crops were 
planted by each household, fewer crops were planted in migrant households. Second, contract 
farming has also been used as a strategy to diversify farm pathways with two contract farming 
projects focused on sericulture and rape with links to companies that guarantee higher prices. 
Respondents suggested that this has deepened commercialisation of farming and has led to 
intensification on these farms, manifested by more material and labour inputs in contract 
farming. Third, due to the high cost of hired farm labour a key strategy of Hu villagers has been 
a shift towards modern capital-intensive labour-saving technologies which have gone hand-in-
hand with government incentives for mechanisation (see below).  
      These trends suggest several processes that are important for both strengthening and 
weakening community resilience. First, resilience has been weakened through both 
deagrarianisation and outmigration. In economic terms deagrarianisation has removed one of 
the stable economic elements of village life (albeit not very profitable in the past), while 
outmigration has increased the dependency of those remaining in the village on remittances 
(see also below). As there are few opportunities in Qingshen County for Hu villagers, only a 
small percentage of households has been able to opt for localised resilience strategies. In 
addition, as most non-farm jobs are found in urban areas (industry, service sector) the fortunes 
of many Hu village households have become tightly bound up with macro-economic conditions, 
increasing the economic dependency of Hu residents on the vicissitudes of global market forces. 
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For instance, the 2008 global financial crisis and the decline of China’s real estate industry 
since 2015 have caused millions of migrants to return to their rural hometowns in Sichuan, 
which has also been witnessed in Hu village.  
      Second, while outmigration and deagrarianisation inevitably have negative repercussions 
for resilience, they have nonetheless meant that diversification is emerging as a key economic 
survival strategy at household level. As Tong and Wen (2010) emphasised, rural economic 
diversification emphasises the integration between specialisation of labour at individual level 
and the professional diversification of livelihoods at household level. As the critical resilience 
literature suggests, diversification can often be associated with strengthening resilience as 
economic risk is spread over several development trajectories (multifunctionality) rather than 
just relying on one key source of income (monofunctionality) (Wilson, 2010).  
      Third, the fact that subsistence farming continues to be an important strategy despite rapidly 
modernising development pathways suggests that Hu villagers are aware that ensuring local 
supply of food continues to be crucial for community resilience at a time of rapid economic 
upheaval. However, increased engagement of Hu residents in non-farm activities has also been 
an important economic diversification strategy, with the result that the number of households 
engaged in farming is declining further every year. Nonetheless, agriculture is surviving in Hu 
village largely thanks to modern inputs and mechanisation (i.e. agricultural outputs are likely 
to remain relatively high), although labour loss linked to migration emerges an increasingly 
prominent problem, meaning that agriculture is playing a decreasing role in household 
livelihood strategies and is progressively marginalised. However, there remains still a strong 
attachment to the land, even among urban migrants, echoing Huang et al.’s (2010) findings for 
other parts of China. Overall, therefore, economic resilience strategies are complex in Hu 
village. Most households maintain a link to agriculture but with different intensity or 
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specialisation, while migration households tend to reduce land use-intensity and agricultural 
diversity due to labour shortages. 
      Labour-saving farming technologies and mechanisation have also had substantial impacts 
on the natural domain in Hu village, most of which have been negative and have, therefore, 
lowered community resilience. Since the 1970s Hu village agriculture has no longer been 
organic and many artificial inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, herbicides) are today applied to a wide 
variety of crops (there are 3 fertiliser and pesticide shops in the village) (Hu and Rahman, 2016). 
Chemical fertilisers are often supplemented by small amounts of manure, but older farmers 
were more likely to use manure than young farmers because they were concerned about 
environmental impacts of artificial inputs. In addition, wealthier farmers in Hu village also 
tended to reduce the intensity of pesticide use for health reasons. However, households with 
migration (i.e. with less availability of farm labour), have tended to use more chemical 
fertilisers and less manure, highlighting that migration has an impact on soil management. 
Overall, yields have been sustained but crop diversity has been reduced, biodiversity has 
decreased due to increased use of chemical inputs, and traditional seed varieties have gradually 
been abandoned in favour of high-yielding varieties (Hu and Rahman, 2016). Hu village, 
therefore, witnesses substitution effects between modern chemical fertilisers and labour-
intensive manure among migration households, which has meant that crop productivity has 
been substantially improved and that production has, therefore, stayed more-or-less the same 
as in the past despite reduced farm labour. But time-saving agricultural technologies have also 
had an impact on water management for agriculture: a new technology used is the throwing of 
rice seedlings (rather than planting by hand) which saves labour (especially for migrant 
households) but, in return, needs ample water on rice paddies for several weeks. This has put 
more pressure on Sichuan water resources. In resilience terms, labour-saving farming 
technologies have, therefore, negatively impacted Hu village’s natural resources. 
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      The social and cultural domains are equally complex in Hu village. Several socio-cultural 
trends identified in the literature on how globalisation and modernisation are affecting Chinese 
rural communities were also prevalent in Hu village. Many respondents, for example, 
expressed ‘disappointment’ with agriculture with statements such as “farming is annoying 
work” (Resp D), “agriculture is useless work now” (Resp Z), “farming is hopeless, [it means] 
working hard for little return” (Resp A), or “nobody wants to do farming except the elderly” 
(Resp F). In Hu village, therefore, agriculture, which used to be the mainstay of household 
livelihoods, has now become a sideline, increasingly perceived as a low status occupation. 
Focus group discussants suggested that being a government official or a businessmen are seen 
as jobs to aspire for and migrants who made their fortune elsewhere were particularly idolised 
(see also Croll and Huang, 1997). As a result, Hu’s rural children are being told that 
“agriculture and the countryside have little future” (Resp Z) and moving out of agriculture is 
becoming the established cultural norm. Yet, at the time of survey there were only 45 non-
agricultural hukou residents in Hu village (i.e. <2%) with some government officials, teachers, 
factory workers and some young adults having successfully shifted to an urban hukou (and 
thereby losing their entitlement to land). 
      The discussion of the economic domain already highlighted that outmigration has led to a 
shift from traditional technologies to modernised labour-saving technologies. This also has 
socio-cultural repercussions as the increased use of large machines such as combine harvesters 
marginalises women in farming leading to a more masculinised agriculture. Increased use of 
combine harvesters also means that migrants do not need to return home for harvest, with 
further repercussions for community cohesion. Yet, outmigration has not only led to a steady 
and dramatic decline in the agricultural population of the village (see above), but has also 
affected the gender balance. Although about half of the 2938 village residents are female, the 
age group 16-30 has more females than males due to the higher likelihood of young males 
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migrating for employment. Due to migration of young people, the population pyramid is further 
skewed towards older residents (also linked to China’s one-child policy) with people >60 
making up a substantial part of the village population (21% compared with a national average 
of 13%). In addition, average Hu household size is now relatively low (3.0 people/household) 
and migration has led to many larger households being broken up into smaller units. 
      Outmigration has also severely affected the composition of the Hu nuclear family. While 
in the past most households had at least 3 generations living together, today 47% of households 
are nuclear family only (couple + children), although 44% of households still have a linear 
family pattern (consistent with the rest of China) and, overall, the family household still serves 
as major social unit. One-child families in particular have chosen to remain close to their 
extended family for support, but urban migration has contributed to the rising popularity of the 
linear family (77% of linear families are migrant families). Nonetheless, married migrant 
couples often rely on linear family relationships which can provide invaluable help with 
custody of children, further exacerbated by the hukou problem which means that young migrant 
couples cannot permanently reside in urban areas and have to rely on rural family members to 
look after their children. Thus, left-behind elderly stay with left-behind children while migrant 
couples work outside the community. The migrant linear family greatly increases the labour 
burden for the left-behind elderly who have to do the farm work and look after the 
grandchildren, resulting in immense social pressures (Ye and He, 2008). 
      These changes in the social makeup of Hu village highlight several intertwined processes 
that all have repercussions for the resilience of the community. Geriatrification as a result of 
the sharp generational divide emphasises growing intergenerational divisions and relations. 
Other studies have highlighted the tendency towards an increasingly old farming population in 
China (Huang et al., 2010), as migration has led to left-behind women and left-behind elderly. 
Ye and He (2008) estimated that there are ca 20 million left-behind elderly in Chinese rural 
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communities. In Hu village 70% of old residents (60+) are the principal farmers in their 
households and in 40% of households agriculture is mainly undertaken by those aged 60+, 
suggesting a pronounced inter-generational division within rural households as part of a 
collective and rational household strategy for maximising household security and labour 
efficiency. As elderly Respondent D highlighted,  
 
“For us, this arrangement [adult children work away, elderly stay behind] is the best option. 
We are too old to migrate or do other non-farm jobs, and have to return to agriculture. Our 
adult children have to work in more lucrative sectors because the whole family is dependent 
on their income. We do farming to provide food for the whole family, and we take care of the 
grandchildren to allow our children to migrate”.  
 
Hu village youngsters, meanwhile, see their future in the cities:  
 
“There are no opportunities for us in the village, even in the county. Local salaries are low, 
infrastructure is poor, and people are traditional. I feel somehow left behind from my friends 
who are working in the city. After a while, I will leave again, there is no hope in the village.” 
 
This, however, places a high burden on old people left behind in villages, an issue described as 
an ‘exploitative generational relationship’ by Ye and He (2008). In Hu village, the elderly often 
have to pay for their grandchildren’s education as their migrant children do not always send 
remittances back. In addition, old people struggle particularly with the new demands for land 
management (especially linked to mechanisation), although many elderly respondents argued 
that they see what they do as part of their family responsibilities and  being part of what it 
means to be a ‘good farmer’. Chen and Korinek (2010), therefore, suggested that 
geriatrification of farming forms an important aspect of a collective family strategy, with 
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constant coordination and cooperation between generations within a household. Thus, 
geriatrification in Hu village has to be seen as an outcome of family division strategies and 
structural constraints, echoing Huang et al.’s (2010) findings from other Chinese rural 
communities.  
      In resilience terms, geriatrification has to be seen as a process lowering the resilience of Hu 
village, especially as it disrupts learning pathways and social memory between the generations 
and also tends to affect village cohesion (bonding capital). Indeed, interviews and focus groups 
revealed that Hu village youths increasingly put their own emotions above social expectations 
and see their role in society no longer about their responsibilities to the family and the local 
community but first and foremost about their own rights and needs. Collective identities and 
group membership have become secondary to personal preferences, with large repercussions 
for community resilience. Geriatrification particularly prevents young migrants from learning 
age-old skills related to sustainable smallholder farming, and, as several studies have 
highlighted, geriatrified rural communities often lack the vibrancy and energy needed at times 
of crisis (Wilson et al., 2016). That young and middle aged migrants are no longer part of key 
decision-making processes was a concern raised by several respondents. Most importantly, 
geriatrification is closely linked to over-empowerment of younger people (mainly because of 
increasing income gaps between young and old), the breakdown of the traditional parent-son 
relationship which was fundamental in traditional Chinese society (He, 2010), and the fact that 
traditions in rural families are considerably weakened during the encounter of young migrants 
with modernity. In Hu village respondents argued that this has led to increasingly rationalised 
family relations and an over-emphasis on material interests further exacerbating inter-
generational divisions (see also Rigg et al., 2012). Respondents further argued that 
geriatrification has led to the breakdown of ‘Confucian values’, especially the key idea that a 
peaceful society is built on the family as an extended, stable unit of several generations under 
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one roof, each with a distinct social role and status. Indeed, all respondents were affected by 
changes to family ties and dispersed kinsfolk across vast distances, and it was evident that 
notions of family and identity have struggled to keep up with Hu village’s accelerated 
modernisation.  
      Feminisation of agricultural production is also a key concern for Hu village, linked to the 
fact that nearly 70% of migrants in Hu village are male. Chinese rural women are more likely 
to remain in agriculture than men (e.g. Fan, 2009), and this was also evident in Hu village 
where about 2/3 of full-time farmers were female, while men tended to dominate in other 
occupations such as employment in local non-farming enterprises, self-employment, or 
working as government officials. These gender divisions are nothing new as the traditional 
intra-household gender division of ‘male outside-female inside’, deriving from Chinese 
Confucian traditions, still dominates rural families (Fan, 2009), although the extent and 
magnitude of male outmigration from rural communities is unprecedented. As a result, ‘left-
behind-women’ stay in villages to take care of children (Lei, 2003), and in Hu village ca 30% 
of households have ‘left-behind-women’. Some typical comments by left-behind-women 
included: “if there were no old people to support I would definitely join my husband” (Resp 
M), or “I have stayed for my son’s education, otherwise I would also go away for work” (Resp 
L). Nonetheless, some left-behind-women have shown initiative in creating diverse and 
buoyant diversification activities (e.g. planting mushrooms, raising rabbits, bamboo weaving), 
although it was evident that many also yearned for urban modern lifestyles and increasingly 
abhor farming especially as considerable agricultural workloads are placed on older women.  
      This feminisation of economic pathways in Hu village has substantial implications for 
community resilience, especially as migrating males tend to be the ones more exposed to 
modernity and a rise in material interests, further exacerbating gender divisions within current 
rural families and acting as potential drivers of family division (Fan, 2009). Although Hu 
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village families are using flexibility, livelihood security and family division to achieve 
household-level resilience, the feminisation of rural life in Hu village reduces community 
resilience.  
      Education is often seen as the key way out of agriculture (Lei, 2003), and De Brauw and 
Rozelle (2003) highlighted that one year of additional education in China raises non-farm 
wages by as much as 6% and results in 8% higher migration, highlighting that the migratory 
population has higher education. This was also the case in Hu village where parents invest a 
lot of money and time in better child education. Rural schools in Hu village are poor and, as a 
result, Hu village farmers often stop farming and take on other jobs to pay for their children’s 
education elsewhere. Indeed, only 1.3% of sample households with children in education were 
full-time farmers and many were migrant households. In resilience terms education, therefore, 
emerges as a significant driver for rural non-farm job diversification and a ‘good farmer’ was 
seen by many respondents as one who can pay for children’s education. However, the hukou 
system often prevents rural children from entering city schools and universities and, overall, 
the national education policy continues to be unfavourable to rural migrants. 
      The multifaceted changes engendered by these socio-cultural processes in Hu village have 
been profound. It is evident from respondent’s answers that the quest for modernity is 
increasingly important, further exacerbating the urban/rural divide. Rural spaces in China are 
increasingly constructed as backward (Ngai, 2003; Riley, 2013), and the result has been that 
rural youth in Hu village yearn for modernised lifestyles in cities, further exacerbated by 
consumerism causing a ‘one-way-mobility’ (Chen and Korinek, 2010). This negative cultural 
construction of rural communities in the process of the Chinese quest for modernisation, 
therefore, lays down the ideological foundation for rural residents’ attitudes and actions 
towards agriculture and rural communities which has also resulted in substantial physical 
changes to Hu village community: consumerism and external expression of wealth have led to 
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a spate of non-traditional houses built in so-called ‘urban’ styles and the purchase of high-
status cars. The result has been that Chinese rural migrants no longer feel ‘at home’ when they 
are in their villages which, as Ngai (2003) emphasised, leads to weaker community cohesion 
and diminishing mutual help. Hu village thus epitomises the loss of the traditional Chinese 
village as an ‘acquaintance community’ (Fei, 1998) where villagers in the past were tightly 
interconnected within networks of family ties and community relations with strong community 
cohesion and strong reciprocity. With modernity, Hu village community has been gradually 
disassociated into a ‘semi-acquaintance community’ (He, 2010) or an ‘atomised community’ 
(Chen and Korinek, 2010) characterised by increasing individualism. Personal connections, 
interaction and trust have greatly diminished, further weakening community cohesion and 
lowering resilience. This was emphasised by the Hu village head who referred to the 
diminishment of mutual help in agriculture:  
 
“Now villagers are more and more like strangers with each other. Many migrants don’t return 
for so long that when we meet we don’t know how to chat, just with a simple greeting. In 
addition, in the past, we helped each other a lot. For example, if a family wanted to build a 
house, then many villagers, relatives, and friends came to help for free. And then another who 
wanted to build a house, or do other things could also receive voluntary help from villagers. 
This mutual help was very common. But now it is rare. Everyone is thinking about money; no 
one is willing to help others for free. Everything is coupled with money.” 
 
This suggests a dramatic decline of community cohesion and reciprocity, and that Hu village 
community relations are built increasingly on market rules as the deep penetration of market 
economy ideologies has greatly disassociated villagers’ personal relations. Today everything 
is seen as an economic transaction and ‘free’ mutual help among villagers is very rare – clear 
signs of diminishing resilience at community level. 
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      In the Chinese context the political domain will be particularly important (and complex) 
as the Chinese Communist Party continues to influence all levels of decision-making and 
regulates many community-based agricultural activities through subsidies and regulations. 
Although changes in policy trajectories since 1949 have affected Hu village just like any other 
Chinese rural community, the Chinese authorities have also implemented more region-specific 
policies. The ‘Go-West-Campaign’ of the 1990s and 2000s, for example, has been an important 
policy for the development of 12 provinces and autonomous regions from north-west to south-
west China including Sichuan province. It has provided large-scale development opportunities 
for these provinces through substantial additional investment in infrastructure, environmental 
conservation measures and economic restructuring (away from agriculture). It has also 
supported agricultural production based on regional specialisations and has also been one of 
the key drivers for agricultural industrialisation in communities such as Hu village. Some of 
the larger-scale agricultural enterprises established recently in Hu village (mentioned above) 
have benefited from this scheme. 
      County policies affecting Hu village have focused on agricultural modernisation, including 
investments in infrastructure (especially irrigation and roadbuilding), and promotion of new 
agricultural technology, partly as a response to the loss of male migrants. This has not only 
provided incentives for Hu village for the establishment of new agricultural enterprises, but has 
also supported traditional agricultural practices such as sericulture. Almost all respondents 
agreed, however, that for Hu village subsidies have been one of the most important policies. 
Gradual increases in payments per ha have meant that subsidies have gained increasing 
importance for farming households in their decision whether to stay in agriculture or to migrate. 
Hu villagers who are receiving subsidies argued that they have been particularly important for 
the purchase of grain, artificial inputs, seeds and machinery. Hu village farmers receive ca 
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1500/yuan/ha (of which grain subsidies make up ca 30%) although sums are often smaller as 
many farmers have less than 1 ha.  
      Hu farmers generally expressed gratitude to the government for the receipt of subsidies but 
also argued that subsidies may reinforce trajectories that tend to weaken community resilience 
such as geriatrification and the feminisation of agriculture. However, a subsidised rabbit 
breeding programme was seen as very positive by respondents as it encouraged left-behind 
women to participate in more cash-generating activities. In addition, many respondents argued 
that as migrant families keep subsidies on land they lease out to other farmers, subsidies 
provide another incentive for migrants to keep their link to the land. However, there was also 
nearly unanimous agreement that no migrant farmer will return to farming because of subsidies, 
as subsidy payments levels are usually too low compared to migrant wages. 
      In Hu village government projects are, nonetheless, marred by an ossified bureaucracy and 
linear implementation systems that often cannot deal with increasingly complex local situations. 
Two government subsidised projects in Hu village illustrate the problem. First, the Autumn 
Potato Project (APP) established in 2009 provides free potato seed and artificial inputs 
(especially pesticides) while participants provide land, fertiliser and labour. However, 
respondents mentioned problems with project implementation, potato diseases and poor 
harvests as Hu village soils are not very suitable for potato growing. Official documentation 
nonetheless portrays the APP as a great success. Second, the Modern Pig Farming Project since 
2010 provides subsidies for modern hoggeries and was well received in Hu village (ca 100 
households participated with 70% building new hoggeries). Although respondents suggested 
that this was a ‘good project’ on the whole, after a few years only few have kept hoggeries, 
largely because farmers lacked experience and skills to manage large numbers of pigs. Yet 
again, official documentation has portrayed the pig scheme as a success, suggesting a 
substantial discrepancy between government rhetoric and farmer satisfaction. More positively 
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rated have been government subsidies for forestry with the aim to increase forest cover to 
prevent land degradation (strengthening community resilience) and for the planting of Chinese 
medicinal herbs that also maintain and foster local traditional medicinal knowledge (again 
positive for resilience). 
      Overall, it is evident that government politics are all pervasive in Hu village and that the 
Chinese government continues to make substantial interventions in Chinese rural society. As a 
result, the political status of Hu village residents, i.e. whether they are members of the 
Communist Party or not, plays an important role with regard to opportunities open to villagers. 
Although questions on the role of the Communist Party could not be asked explicitly, implicitly 
many respondents agreed that membership of the Communist Party at times helped livelihood 
strategies and often party members would be the first to have access to, or receive, government 
aid. Hu village, therefore, highlights that Chinese communities are still constrained by political 
factors as to how much free expression of cultural processes are possible and have to also steer 
a pathway of compromise within the boundaries of accepted (Communist Party) ideological 
norms (Meng, 2016). It is here that assessments of resilience are at their most difficult and 
subjective (see Wilson 2012a, and Brown, 2014, for critical discussions) as the positionality of 
the researcher becomes key for the objective/subjective evaluation of impacts of a political 
system on community resilience. Our subjective assessment of the political resilience of Hu 
village is, therefore, that, as with other domains discussed in this study, political factors both 
strengthen and weaken resilience. Positive are policies and incentives that focus on keeping 
residents in the village (e.g. subsidies that help left-behind elderly and women) and schemes 
that focus on reducing land degradation (e.g. forestry projects), while negative are policies that 
have not managed to stem outmigration and the geriatrification of Hu village. In the near- to 
mid-term future it is, therefore, unlikely that government intervention will substantially alter 




Discussion and conclusions 
 
How resilient, then, is Hu village community? Above analysis has shown that in the economic 
domain there are propelling forces that both raise and lower resilience of Hu village. On the 
one hand, there is no doubt that – as in many other rural communities across China (Huang et 
al., 2010) – globalisation of China and associated modernisation have substantially increased 
wealth and incomes of Hu residents and have forced communities to increasingly diversify 
economically (multifunctionality = increased resilience). However, simultaneously, 
inequalities between wealthy and poor(er) residents have increased: As De Brauw and Rozelle 
(2003) and Fan (2009) emphasised in their studies, households with migrants have generally 
seen their wealth increase (provided remittances are sent back) (increased resilience), while 
households that have opted for maintaining agricultural trajectories (non-migration) have 
generally seen their income levels increase less fast (increased vulnerability). The overall 
outcome suggests, therefore, moderate resilience of Hu village in economic resilience terms 
(Figure 3). 
 
Insert Figure 3 in or near here 
 
The critical resilience literature often argues that community resilience can be seen as a zero-
sum-game (Miller et al., 2010), and frameworks such as Kelly et al. (2015) – which this study 
has used as its conceptual springboard – may tend to reinforce the notion that raising resilience 
in one domain may inevitably lead to a lowering of resilience in another domain. Although this 
can be challenged empirically as there is clear evidence that some communities are more 
resilient than others and that some communities that have disappeared altogether evidently had 
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no resilience (e.g. Kelly et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2016), in the case of Hu village the notion 
of resilience as a zero-sum-game may be true with regard to one crucial domain: the strategy 
of many households (especially those with migrants) to buffer deagrarianisation trends linked 
to an increasing lack of farm labour by adopting labour-saving strategies such as mechanisation 
and especially the substitution of traditional environmentally-friendly farm practices (e.g. using 
animal manure as fertiliser) by artificial fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides (raising or at least 
maintaining resilience levels), which has led to the degradation of water and soil resources 
(weak resilience in the natural/environmental domain; see also Hu and Rahman, 2016). 
Agricultural substitution effects engendered by dramatic socio-economic upheaval in Hu 
village have, therefore, almost inevitable negative consequences for the resilience of the 
community (Figure 3). 
      The resilience picture with regard to the social and cultural domains is equally complex, 
and points towards weakening resilience trajectories. The social fabric of Hu village has been 
severely affected by globalisation and modernisation and the impacts on community networks, 
cohesion and ability for self-help have been, on the whole, negative. It comes as little surprise 
that what is possibly the largest ever seen rural-urban migration in human history has 
substantial effects on social and cultural processes in China’s rural communities (Xia, 2016). 
The key factors identified here were linked to geriatrification (left-behind elderly) with 
inevitable negative repercussions for resilience, especially as greying communities are less 
vibrant and able to cope with sudden shocks and disturbances (Wilson et al., 2016) and are less 
able to pass on knowledge and skills to the younger generation (disruption of social memory), 
thereby weakening resilience (Wilson, 2015). Similarly the feminisation (left-behind women) 
of economic pathways (mainly but not exclusively linked to agriculture) is engendering 
problems of its own related to increasing gender divisions and the breakup of the traditional 
Chinese nuclear family which, until recently, formed the core of village social life. Inevitably, 
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this has also had repercussions for the cultural domain in Hu village, especially through the 
marginalisation of agriculture as a key economic and cultural activity where rural areas are 
now construed as backward and traditional (weak resilience) and through the breaking down 
of long-established traditions and rites associated with village life because of increasing 
selfishness and profit-maximisation associated with the transition to a globalised capitalist 
society. Overall, therefore, social and cultural resilience of Hu village can, at best, be 
categorised as moderately resilient with tendencies for increasing vulnerability (see Figure 3). 
      As expected the political domain in Hu village was the most difficult to assess in resilience 
terms, although it is evident that the political concern for food security in China drives many 
current policies (e.g. agricultural subsidies) (Huang et al., 2010). Although there is clear 
evidence that government policy and institutions are attempting to buffer the impacts of 
globalisation and modernisation on communities such as Hu village (e.g. by attempting to 
address the issue of left-behind elderly and women), top-down policies are inevitably 
paradoxical in attempting to both encourage globalisation/modernisation while maintain 
smallholder farming in rural areas. As Tong and Wen (2010) and Tian (2016) have argued, 
government policies are, therefore, only able to scratch the surface with regard to buffering 
impacts of complex socio-cultural transitions. However, it could be argued that, although 
morally and ethically questionable by forcing rural migrants to keep a foothold in their rural 
communities, the hukou system has paradoxically raised the resilience of Chinese rural 
communities by ensuring that rural migrants have a reason to return to their villages (e.g. for 
seasonal help with farming; visiting their children who have limited access to urban education 
systems). As Huang et al. (2010) emphasised, the livelihoods of most Chinese rural migrants, 
therefore, still rely on a combination of migration and agriculture. Although highly reliant on 
the continuation of food production by left-behind elderly and women, this ensures at least to 
some extent continued agricultural production and, therefore, food security from local 
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production (i.e. akin to strong resilience). Although value judgements particularly come to the 
fore when assessing the merits or disadvantages of the political domain (Kelly et al., 2015), 
above analysis suggests that the current socio-political situation in communities such as Hu 
village is nonetheless untenable in the long term, especially as village communities cannot be 
expected to rely increasingly on left-behind elderly and women to maintain current socio-
economic trajectories (weak resilience) (Figure 3). The resilience of Hu village with regard to 
the political domain has, therefore, to be interpreted as weak. 
      Overall, and echoing recent Chinese studies (Tian, 2016; Xia, 2016), Hu village depicts a 
pattern of mixed resilience processes (see Figure 3), with some vestiges of strong resilience 
(e.g. that many left-behind elderly and women have been willing to continue to maintain the 
economic, social and cultural life of the village; diversification activities with regard to farming 
and non-farming economic opportunities), many moderately resilient processes (e.g. 
maintenance of a relatively productive agriculture; young migrants still have a foothold in the 
village because of the hukou system; emergence of non-farming enterprises in the community), 
but also clear signs of vulnerability (e.g. geriatrification and feminisation of village economic 
activities; gradual breakdown of family and social networks; reduced community cohesion; 
increased environmental degradation). It is the latter processes that are of particular concern, 
as short- and mid-term trajectories are likely to further worsen the situation in communities 
like Hu village. Overall, therefore, Hu village can be described as (still) moderately resilient to 
future shocks and disturbances but it is also on a pathway of increasing economic, social, 
cultural, political and environmental vulnerability with trajectories that are likely to deteriorate 
in the near future (Figure 3). As Wang (2016) and Tian (2016) highlighted, this is sending out 
clear signals to Chinese policy-makers as to where some of the most urgent policy interventions 
may be needed if the authorities want to prevent further depopulation and economic 
marginalisation of the Chinese countryside. If we accept that resilience can be used as a 
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normative concept that can inform policies (see introduction), more robust policies are needed 
to help left-behind elderly and women in rural communities and to strengthen community 
networks and cohesion by rediscovering strongly resilient community pathways.  
      Hu village and other Chinese rural communities are by no means alone in facing substantial 
problems related to outmigration of young people, geriatrification and the associated 
maintenance of the most basic social and cultural processes that villages have relied on for 
centuries (Wilson, 2012a). Indeed, many transition economies are dominated by agricultural 
modernisation regimes, have embarked on market-led neo-liberal economic reforms, are 
characterised by insecure property rights, and show tensions between the agribusiness and 
smallholder family farm model (Rigg, 2007). Resilience processes identified for Hu village 
also resonate with key issues highlighted in research using the ‘sustainable livelihoods 
framework’ which emphasises the urgent need for further internationalisation of research on 
community resilience (Lindenberg, 2002; Rigg and Oven, 2015). In many instances aspects of 
community resilience are already examined in development studies and investigations 
undertaken by aid agencies (e.g. Rasul et al., 2015; Jones and Tanner, 2015; IFRC, 2016), but 
often this research is couched in the language of resilience proxies associated with ‘sustainable 
livelihoods’ and, therefore, not easily accessible to the resilience research community. This 
nonetheless offers fruitful avenues for future research on the resilience of rural communities in 
China that may be able to use indicators of the livelihoods framework to investigate in greater 
depth key issues affecting the resilience of Chinese rural communities. At this stage, however, 
it is difficult to tell how representative findings from Hu village are with regard to both the 
resilience of rural communities in wider China or in other transition economies due to the 
absence of studies using similar approaches. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will be used 
both as a conceptual and empirical platform for further comparative resilience work and that it 
will also spark further interest among Chinese researchers in particular to critically engage with 
36 
 




The authors wish to thank the community of Hu village, and especially the respondents who 
participated in the survey, for their cooperation and help. The authors acknowledge funding by 
the University of Plymouth, UK, for Zhanping Hu’s PhD thesis which formed the basis for this 
article. Finally, the authors also wish to thank the anonymous referee for constructive 
comments on an earlier version of this article. 
 
 
References   
 
Brown, L. 2014: Global environmental change I: a social turn for resilience? Progress in 
Human Geography 38 (1): 107-117. 
Buikstra, E. et al. 2010: The components of resilience: perceptions of an Australian rural 
community. Journal of Community Psychology 38 (8): 975-991. 
Chen, F. and K. Korinek 2010: Family life course transitions and rural household economy 
during China’s market reform. Demography 47 (4): 963-987.                                            
Chen, S. 2014: The opportunities of ruins: a poster-disaster study of the 2008 Sichuan 
Earthquake (Feixu shangde Qiji: Wenchaun Dizhen Zaihou Chongjian Yanjiu). 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, China Agricultural University.  
Croll, E.J. and P. Huang 1997: Migration for and against agriculture in eight Chinese villages. 
The China Quarterly 149: 128-146. 
Cumming, G.S., Barnes, G., Perz, S., Schmink, M., Sieving, K.E., Southworth J., Binford, M., 
Holt, R.D., Stickler, C. and T. Van Holt 2005: An exploratory framework for the 
empirical measurement of resilience. Ecosystems 8: 975-987. 
De Brauw, A.L. and S. Rozelle 2003: Migration and household investment in rural China. 
China Economic Review 19 (2): 320-335. 
Emery, M. and C. Flora 2006: Spiralling up: mapping community transformation with 
community capital framework. Community Development 37: 19-30. 
Fan, C.C. 2009: Flexible work, flexible household: labour migration and rural families in China. 
Research in the Sociology of Work 19: 377-408. 
Fu, C., Leoutsakos, J.M. and C. Underwood 2014: An examination of resilience cross-
culturally in child and adolescent survivors of the 2008 China earthquake using the 
Connor-Davidson resilience scale. Journal of Affective Disorders 155: 149-153. 
He, X. 2010: Keywords of rural society: a sketch of China’s rural society in the early 21st 
century. Shandong: Shandong People Press. 
Hillman, B. 2014: Patronage and power: local state networks and party-state resilience in 
rural China. Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press. 
Hu, Z. and S. Rahman 2015: Economic drivers of contemporary smallholder agriculture in a 
transitional economy: a case study of Hu village from southwest China. Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 36: 324-341. 
37 
 
Hu, Z. and S. Rahman 2016: Beyond a bottle of liquid: pesticide dependence in transitional 
rural China. Local Environment. 21(8):919-938. 
Huang, J.K., Yang, J. and S. Rozelle 2010: China’s agriculture: drivers of change and 
implications for China and the rest of the world. Agricultural Economics 41: 47-55. 
IFRC [International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies] 2016: World 
disasters report 2016: resilience - saving lives today, investing for tomorrow. Geneva: 
IFRC.  
Jiang, B. 2017: Post-disaster reconstruction and the rebuilding of disaster conceptions among 
Qiang ethnic people. Journal of Southwest Minzu University 7: 1-7.  
Jones, L. and T. Tanner 2015: Measuring ‘subjective resilience’: using people’s perceptions to 
quantify household resilience. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Kelly, C., Ferrara, A., Wilson, G.A., Ripullone, F. and A. Nole 2015: Community resilience 
and land degradation in forest and shrubland socio-ecological systems: evidence from 
Gorgoglione, Basilicata, Italy. Land Use Policy 46: 11-20. 
Lei, G. 2003: Rural taste, urban fashions: the cultural politics of rural/urban difference in 
contemporary China. East Asia Cultures Critique 11 (3): 613-646. 
Li, H., Qu, X. and M. Yan 2009: Social re-adaption, participatory reconstruction and anti-
vulnerability development: reflections on the reconstruction of communities affected 
by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Social Science Research 3: 1-7. 
Li, K. 2017: Ten-year studies of ‘risk, crisis and disaster prevention’. Journal of Southwest 
Minzu University 8: 28-36. 
Li, X., Wang, L. and S. Liu 2016: Geographical analysis of community resilience to seismic 
hazard in southwest China. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 7: 257-276. 
Lindenberg, M. 2002: Measuring household livelihood security at the family and community 
level in the developing world. World Development 30 (2): 301-318. 
Meng, I. 2016: The development of grand mediation and its implications for China’s regime 
resilience. The China Review 16 (1): 95-119. 
Miller, F. et al. 2010: Resilience and vulnerability: complementary or conflicting concepts? 
Ecology and Society 15 (3): 11.  
Ngai, P. 2003: Subsumption or consumption? The phantom of consumer revolution in 
‘globalizing’ China. Cultural Anthropology 18 (4): 469-492.  
Rae, A.N., Ma, H., Huang, J.K. and S. Rozelle 2006: Livestock in China: commodity-specific 
total factor productivity decomposition using new panel data. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 88(3): 680-695. 
Rasul, G., Sharma, B., Mishra, B., Neupane, N., Dorji, T., Khadka, M. and S. Joshi 2015: 
Strategic framework for resilient livelihoods in earthquake-affected areas of Nepal. 
ICIMOD Working Paper 2015/6. Kathmandu: ICIMOD [International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development].  
Resilience Alliance 2007: Assessing resilience in social-ecological systems: a workbook for 
scientists. www.resalliance.org/3871.php (last accessed 20 December 2016). 
Spradley, J.P. 2016: Participant observation. Long Grove (Ill.): Waveland Press. 
Rigg. J. 2001: More than the soil: rural change in southeast Asia. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Rigg, J. 2006: Land, farming, livelihoods, and poverty: rethinking the links in the rural South. 
World Development 34 (1): 180-202.  
Rigg, J. 2007: An everyday geography of the global south. London: Routledge. 
Rigg, J., Salamanca, A. and M. Parnwell 2012: Joining the dots of agrarian change in Asia: a 
25 Year view from Thailand. World Development 40 (7): 1469-1481. 
Riley, N.E. 2013: Gender, work, and family in a Chinese economic zone. Amsterdam: Springer.   
38 
 
Tian, G. 2016: The rapid decline of villages and rural landscapes in China. Unpublished paper 
presented at the IGU International Conference on Land Use and Rural Sustainability, 
Xi’an (China), 17-20 August 2016. 
Tong, Z.H. and T.J. Wen 2010: The transference of capital and departmental capital to rural 
areas and the organization of farming household economy: to query the path of 
specialised cooperatives. The Chinese Cooperative Economy Review 2: 8-28. 
Wang, L., Shi, Z, Zhang, Y. and Z. Zhang 2010: Psychometric properties of the 10-item 
Connor-Davidson resilience scale in Chinese earthquake victims. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences 64 (5): 499-504. 
Wang, L., Zhang, Y., Wang, W., Shi, Z., Shen, J. and M. Li 2009: Symptoms of posttraumatic 
stress disorder among adult survivors three months after the Sichuan earthquake in 
China. Journal of Traumatic Stress 22 (5): 444-450. 
Wang, J. 2016: Rural depopulation and its effects on settlements in the North China Plain. 
Unpublished paper presented at the IGU International Conference on Land Use and 
Rural Sustainability, Xi’an (China), 17-20 August 2016. 
Wen, J. and W. He 2016: Reconstructing social memory in disaster areas: the example of the 
Shanghai social work empowerment service and the Ludian earthquake. Sociological 
Research 2: 170-193. 
Wilson, G.A. 2010:  Multifunctional ‘quality’ and rural community resilience. Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers  35: 364-381. 
Wilson, G.A. 2012a: Community resilience and environmental transitions. London: 
Earthscan/Routledge. 
Wilson, G.A. 2012b: Community resilience, globalization, and transitional pathways of 
decision-making. Geoforum 43: 1218-1231. 
Wilson, G.A. 2015: Community resilience and social memory. Environmental Values 24 (2): 
227-257. 
Wilson, G.A., Quaranta, G., Kelly, C. and R. Salvia 2016: Community resilience, land 
degradation and endogenous lock-in effects: evidence from the Alento region, 
Campania, Italy. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 59 (3): 518-537. 
Wilson, G.A., Schermer, M. and R. Stotten 2018: The resilience and vulnerability of remote 
mountain communities: the case of Vent, Austrian Alps. Land Use Policy 71: 372-383. 
Xia, W. 2016: Agricultural land and rural-urban migration in China. Unpublished paper 
presented at the IGU International Conference on Land Use and Rural Sustainability, 
Xi’an (China), 17-20 August 2016. 
Ye, J.Z. and C.Z. He 2008: Lonely sunsets: the elderly left-behind in rural China. Beijing: 










Economic domain Community embeddedness 
into capitalist and globalised 
economy 
Increases community-level economic 
opportunities 
Increases community dependency on 
non-local income sources and 
vicissitudes of global markets 
Community wealth Enhanced personal and household 
livelihood opportunities 
Income inequalities at community level 
State subsidies/remittances Well-targeted subsidies can enhance 
community income 
Increased dependency on remittances 
Increased household income  
 
Access to international trade Enhances marketing opportunities for 
community-produced goods 
Increases exposure to global markets 
Outmigration/urbanisation Non-farm employment (diversification of 
income sources) 
 
Remittances boosting income  
 
Social domain Outmigration/urbanisation Increased personal mobility Decrease in bonding capital; breakdown 
of community cohesion and networks 
Improved personal livelihoods Loss of social memory 
 
Increased empowerment of young women Ageing communities (geriatrification) 
and left-behind children (reduced family 
cohesion) 
 Breakdown of traditional rural family 
Cultural domain Outmigration/urbanisation Livelihood diversification Tendency for individualisation (loss of 
community cohesion) 
Opens rural society to modern (+ more 
liberal?) ideas 
Decline of parental authority 
 Split households (reduced household-
level resilience) 
 Cultural marginalisation of agriculture 
Political domain State-led transition to market 
economy 
Increased economic opportunities Increased community dependency on 
non-local income sources 
Empowers rural communities to take 
more control 
Local institutions slow to adapt 
Government policies and 
subsidies 
Enhanced productivity (e.g. agriculture) Increased dependency on external 
income sources and help 
 Continued uncertainty re land rights and 
‘hukou’ 
Natural domain Deagrarianisation/agricultural 
substitution effects 
Labour-saving strategies through 
mechanisation 
Substitution of traditional 
environmentally-friendly practices (e.g. 
less use of manure) 
Increased use of fertilisers, herbicides, 
pesticides 
Degradation of water and soil resources 
 
 
Table 1: Key factors for the resilience and vulnerability of Chinese rural communities in relation to economic, 
social, cultural and political factors (Source: authors; after Croll and Huang, 1997; Yao, 2007; Huang et al., 








Figure 1: Conceptual framework for analysing resilient communities  
















Figure 3: The resilience of Hu village based on economic, social, cultural, political and natural domains 
 (Source: authors) 
 
 
